Strong leadership, corporate visions, and an intense public relations campaign will be necessary to gain acceptance and ensure successful change, both within the Intelligence Community and among the U.S. public.
The Intelligence Community: Realigning to Fight the War After Last
The NSA Office of Corporate Relations presents daily, to visitors, an overview briefing of the agency's mission. In it, reference is made to the "challenges" that NSA faces at the start of a new millennium. The word "challenge" is accurate but understated: NSA is facing a serious survival problem, brought about by the widespread use of emerging communications technologies and public encryption keys, draconian budget cuts, and an increasingly negative public perception of NSA and its SIGENT operations.
NSA is not the only intelligence agency facing such challenges. Budget cuts and force reductions are affecting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and most other agencies. The Intelligence Community (IC) as a whole is under scrutiny as Congress, the media, and the public question the continued need for a massive intelligence structure in an era of relative peace.
In the last several years, CIA, DIA, and NSA all have undergone internal change in response to external drivers. At NSA personnel strength has been reduced by one-third since the end of the Cold War 2 and the Directorate of Operations, in which the bulk of the SIGINT mission is conducted, has seen four major reorganizations in 10 years. NSA's latest initiative, christened "100 Days of Change" by current Director Lt Gen. Michael V. Hayden, has gained national media attention.
Despite these attempts at improvement within NSA and other intelligence agencies, the overall intelligence structure is arguably no more effective or efficient than 10 years ago. One could even argue that things have gotten worse: for every intelligence success such as the achievement of information superiority in Desert Storm 3 , there is an embarrassing and potentially dangerous intelligence failure. The IC's failure to predict the 1998 Indian nuclear test and the erroneous bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade are prime examples. Perhaps the problem lies in the fact that the transformation of the Intelligence Community is being approached in piecemeal fashion. Each agency is being asked to make internal changes, while the IC's overall structure and the functions of each member agency remain unchanged.
What is needed is a revamp of the overall IC force structure. While the military focuses its strategic force plans on winning the war after next, the IC can't seem to let go of the force structure that won the war after last the Cold War. The IC should follow the military's lead and plan an intelligence force able to respond to the informational needs of both the tactician and the strategist 20 years hence: the informational war after next. Such a force would most likely look drastically different than the IC of today, and would require a massive transformation-one that goes beyond in-house changes and redefines the role of and relationships among IC organizations.
Three major problems facing the IC today must be addressed within force planning or they will continue to worsen: the diminishing ability to collect and analyze signals intelligence; dwindling resources and inter-agency redundancies; and a growing negative perception of the U.S. Intelligence Community as "Big Brother." These issues are closely related to each other:
communications advancements mean that more money and resources will be needed to provide SIGINT support to military and political planners, but will Congress and the American public approve of increased funding to an area of government whose actions fall under suspicion? • COMINT is based on the contents of communications signals: phone calls, faxes, teleprinter messages, e-mails, HF radio conversations, etc. COMINT can shed light on subjects such as the chain of command within a foreign military organization, political developments within another country, or the voting intentions of a foreign ambassador to the United Nations.
• ELINT derives information from the signal parameters emitted by aircraft, weapons systems, and other platforms. ELINT can help track the flight path of an aircraft, shed light on the operational command and control of a foreign weapons system, or indicate when a ground-based radar site is active (and where is it located)
• FISINT, like ELINT, derives information from non-communications signals, usually telemetry signals between components of a system. The IFF system (Identification, Friend or Foe) used in commercial and military aircraft is an example of a noncommunications signal that carries valuable information.
In general (but not across the board) most strategic-level intelligence comes from COMINT, while FISINT and ELINT are used more in the tactical/operational realms. The "Selective Hearing" Solution
How does NSA continue to provide COMINT support to military and political strategists in the new communications environment? It can't-not by itself and not by using the usual highPage6 tech methods. One of the ironies of the communications revolution is that it will force intelligence methods to take five steps backwards and rely more on active collection techniques of the past: planting "bugs" in computer equipment, stealing passwords or encryption keys, infiltrating organizations. In order to continue to provide COMINT, the human intelligence (HUMINT) discipline must be expanded because the IC will be forced to beg, borrow, and steal in order to gain access to communications.
This type of active collection is associated more with the CIA than with NSA. Joint collection operations will increase, and perhaps even lead to a restructuring, discussed later. At the least, however, because collection will be more manpower intensive, high-risk, and expensive, a policy of "selective hearing" will have to be implemented. The communications of only those targets of highest interest to the U.S. in terms of security strategy will be "staked ouf'
while other, lower-priority targets will be dropped. In other words, NSA and the IC will have to face the fact that COMINT just won't be available on all targets, as it was in the past, and that other methods of information analysis will have to be relied upon for targets of less strategic importance.
Redefining the Fourth Amendment for the Information Age
Computer-to-computer, or C2C, communications pose a different challenge. Technology already exists to collect passively data sent over the Internet. Currently, the United States serves as the hub for Internet communications: most of the world's Internet capacity lies in the United
States and most Internet communications travel via servers located in the United States, regardless of origin. 7 Add to this the fact that Internet Protocol (IP) addresses identity the country and site of both the originator and the recipient, and in theory NSA should have easy access to foreign Internet messages of national security interest without running much risk of inadvertently collecting private U.S. and Allied communications.
However, current policy, based on legal interpretation of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), prohibits the collection and exploitation of these U.S.-relayed Internet communications. FISA is a necessary law: enacted in the wake of intelligence abuses at the hands of a corrupt administration 8 , it protects the Fourth Amendment rights of law-abiding U.S.
citizens by ensuring that the government will not eavesdrop on their communications. And, contrary to recent media allegations 9 , FISA is strictly adhered to by NSA and the IC, who are held accountable by oversight committees, the FISA court, and strict in-house measures of compliance.
FISA as it currently is written, however, makes it extremely difficult for the IC to conduct some operations of national security importance, such as counterintelligence investigations.
Many point to overly restrictive FISA laws as the culprit in the Dr. Wen Ho Lee espionage situation: the Los Alamos scientist was suspected of espionage long before he passed nuclear weapons secrets to Taiwan, but was not under full surveillance because of FISA technicalities.
The loss of those secrets, according to one witness at the bail hearing for the accused, could "change the global strategic balance" 10 and might not have occurred under a more permissive FISA.
FISA was written in the 1970s, long before anyone envisioned a global communications network such as the Internet While it's easy to understand why an international phone conversation with one communicant in the United States should be protected under FISA, it seems counterproductive to U.S. security goals to extend the same blanket protection to an e-mail sent from Seoul to Baghdad via a server at Harvard University. Members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have asserted that:
[W]e do believe that the Department of Justice may be applying the FISA in a manner that is too restrictive, particularly in light of the evolution of a very sophisticated counterintelligence threat and the ongoing revolution in information systems. Where is the enemy? 13 ) and a low-risk means of precision firepower (through robot-or satellitecontrolled weapons).
If the military services are, indeed, building a digitized force that fights techno-wars on a "meshed" sensor battlefield, then the reality is that NSA's involvement in FISINT and ELINT collection and dissemination would add an unnecessary layer and should be eliminated. By shifting responsibility for FISINT and ELINT to DIA and the military services, NSA would be better able to focus its resources on the COMINT challenges it faces, particularly those at the strategic level.
Rebuilding the IC Force Structure
Joint Vision 2010 recognizes that future military operations will be multi-service by nature and that traditional distinctions between service-specific operations are, in many cases, no longer relevant: the Air Force is not the only service that conducts airstrikes, and amphibious landings are no longer the domain of just the Marines. Objective-based force planning also has helped to blur service-specific distinctions. Rather than asking, "How many infantry battalions should make up an Army division?" force planners are focusing more on the desired end result:
"If we wanted to destroy the enemy's military center of gravity, what would we need and how would we do it?" The military structure, in other words, is taking a holistic, objective-oriented approach to force planning.
Meanwhile, the Intelligence Community continues to operate as a collection of separate, monolithic, and often competing, agencies. First, there is the distinction between intelligence producers and intelligence users. Of the 13-member IC 14 , most are strictly users of intelligence, while the four major intelligence producers are CIA, DIA, NSA, and the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA). A second-level distinction occurs among the intelligence producers;
each is defined by the types of information it collects, analyzes, and produces:
• CIA produces HUMENT, or intelligence derived from human sources (agents, spies).
• DIA produces MASENT: Measures and Signatures Intelligence, which gleans information from metrics such as satellite footprints or acoustic patterns.
• NIMA produces imagery intelligence, or IMLMT, based on various types of satellite images: photographic, infrared, multispectral, etc.
• NSA produces SIGINT, or intelligence derived from foreign electromagnetic signals.
So, the U.S. intelligence-producing organizations currently are aligned according to information source. This approach worked well for the duration of the Cold War, but is no longer as effective or workable today, for several reasons:
• The lines between "INTs" have blurred. When a foreign embassy spokesman prepares a press release and forwards it to the media via e-mail, is that considered a SIGINT source, a HUMINT source, or an open-source record?
• Target expertise is too compartmented to be effective. CIA, DIA, NSA, and others all have in-house experts on particular regions or topics-China, Iraq, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking-but the "separate and unequal" IC culture built during the Cold War discourages interaction and collaboration. The result: duplication of effort, piecemeal conclusions, and intelligence failures.
• Gaining access to one "INT" is going to become dependent on one or more other "INT's. For instance, Allied forces were able to record conversations off the mobile telephone system Saddam Hussein used during the Gulf War, but not through the usual methods of using an NSA supercomputer to isolate, demodulate, and decrypt the voice signal. Rather, a CIA-recruited agent provided the phone system's technical manuals and other data that allowed access to the signal. 15 Joint intelligence operations, therefore, will become the rule rather than the exception, but the current structure is not conducive to jointness.
Another aspect to consider is that the IC's current reliance on "special source" intelligence such as the "INTs" already described is expensive and, arguably, duplicative and unnecessary. Robert Steele, founder of Open Source Solutions, maintains that:
[NJeariy 80 percent of the information the government considers classified is available to anyone for the asking... [T] he intelligence community could do a much better job for less money, and with less danger, if it spent its energies on collecting open-source information and turning that information into knowledge." 16 How, then, does the IC reinvent itself to overcome the challenges of duplication, expense, disappearing "special" sources and emerging open sources? Two options would be to realign based on process or by objective.
The Intelligence Cycle Blueprint
Aligning the IC parallel to the steps of the intelligence production cycles used at every agency-i.e., a process-based structure-seems to be a viable option. The SIGINT cycle, for instance, consists of four basic steps: requirements, access, exploitation/analysis, and dissemination. First, a customer (State Dept, CENTCOM, etc.) levies a requirement for information on a particular subject: say, the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard's order of battle. Signals which might carry information satisfying that requirement are identified and, with any luck, access is gained. Once the signal is collected, a great deal of processing usually is required: demodulation, isolation of a voice signal, decryption of printer traffic, translation from a foreign language into English, and analysis of the information. The resulting intelligence analysis findings are disseminated to the customers) who originated the requirement and to others in the IC with a need to know the information; this usually occurs in the form of a SIGINT report. While the cycle just described is the SIGINT cycle, virtually any intelligence production cycle could be described with the same four basic steps. Using a process-aligned structure based on the intelligence cycle, then, four organizations would be appropriate:
• A requirements staff"to gather, disseminate, and track intelligence requirements across the IC. Currently, separate interagency committees establish priorities for each discipline (SIGINT, HUMINT, etc.), resulting in lengthy bureaucratic processes and conflicting viewpoints. Establishing a neutral organization to streamline the process and oversee a largely automated accountability/tracking mechanism would improve overall operations and reduce operating costs for this step of the cycle.
• An access agency tasked with gaining access to information. Access operations would be both defensive (tasking a HUMINT case officer with developing more incountry sources or moving a satellite 20 degrees northward to target a communications signal) and offensive (disrupting an enemy's C3 network) in nature. This agency would require a technology-sawy workforce to face some of the access challenges already discussed.
• An all-source research and analysis agency to develop an in-depth knowledge base on topics vital to the U.S. national security. Target experts currently split among CIA, DIA, and NSA would be combined into a smaller, smarter, and less duplicative IC analytic workforce than the existing one.
• An information assurance agency to maintain a secure, reliable (and bandwidthheavy) network connecting all members of the IC. This network would allow automated dissemination of intelligence estimates and reports.
The 10 Objective Model An alternate approach would be to build intelligence forces around information operations (10) capabilities needed to meet national security goals. Some capability examples:
• Precision strike against enemy communications: destroying a particular communications satellite, blocking access to a Web site, or cutting a fiber optics cable.
• Strategic bombing of enemy centers of gravity: shutting down an entire power grid or a command-and-control network using weapons of "mass disruption" such as computer viruses.
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations for U.S. forces: tactical ISR (the automated, digitized barüespace) and in-depth analysis for strategists (insight into the human aspect of a particular enemy's politics and warfare).
• "Lift" and rapid deployment: placing sensors, networks, and power supplies in theater, "deploying" analytic assets against new targets in support of crises.
• Logistical support: protecting U.S. information systems security (INFOSEC) and ensuring a reliable C4I infrastructure.
A Hybrid Approach
Restructuring the IC around capabilities would require an intelligence force of considerable depth: information technology specialists and topical/cultural experts. A process alignment would place more emphasis on breadth and would fit with the current move to produce multi-disciplined analysts who can be moved from target to target in response to world events. The 10 model fits more closely with military strategy and force structure, while the process model is more closely tied to the current IC structure and would probably be less difficult to implement. Both models have pros and cons; perhaps the most obvious approach is to re-establish intelligence organizations based on process and then develop specialized, IO-focused units within those organizations.
In any case, such restructuring would standardize operations, centralize and expand target awareness and 10 capabilities, and reduce operating costs. The new force structure could accomplish "more with less"-a current mantra among IC budget managers.
Building a Forward-Deployed, Infocentric Intelligence Community
Regardless of the model used to realign or rebuild the IC, an important goal would be to transform the mounds of information available to the IC into usable and useful knowledge. For information to be transformed into knowledge, it must be relevant to the mission needs of specific organizations. This is another area in which the IC currently falls short, and would do well to heed the example of the military services. Building on the concept of network-centric operations used in the business world and in war plans, the IC could create an effective network-centric method of intelligence analysis and dissemination. An informational "mesh" and "net" operation is used by companies such as WalMart 18 to turn tactical point-of-sale information ("How many tightbulbs were bought in Duluth today?") into strategic production planning ("We will need to manufacture and ship five cases of lightbulbs to Duluth before next week."). Similarly, the New York City Police Department has reduced serious crime by using a network-centric approach that combines policemen's in-depth knowledge of a specific "beat" with networked information on citywide crime data. 19 In both cases, piecemeal tactical information becomes strategic knowledge through tailored analysis.
An IC comprising small, specialized teams (target experts) and connected by an Mormation-sharing network could achieve similar success. Forward-deployed intelligence staffs at specific agencies could tap into the information network and build a knowledge base with which to make sound, informed tactical and strategic decisions. The line between intelligence user and intelligence producer would blur as all IC members contribute to and draw upon that network. This approach could be called an "infocentric" approach to intelligence.
The first steps to creating an infocentric IC were taken a few years ago by the Unified Cryptologic Architecture 2010 (UC A 2010), an interagency working group tasked with identifying challenges faced by the IC in the next 10 years. Efforts to modernize and standardize the IC with state-of-the-art, compatible analytic workstations and communications systems already have begun. The groundwork has been laid for an infocentric intelligence force.
Knowing the Enemy Within: Leadership Challenges Posed by Drastic IC Changes
These proposed changes to the IC are drastic ones that transcend organizational, policy, and cultural changes. Incorporating them would inflict a substantial period of confusion, resistance, and pain on the IC workforce. Just as NSA's director acknowledges that it's time to sacrifice some degree of readiness in an effort to modernize 20 , the long-term payoff for shortterm sacrifices would be a new, improved IC-one better able to "mine" information and turn it into knowledge useful to national security strategists.
Regardless of the approach taken to streamline U.S. intelligence operations, strong, dedicated, and trusted leadership will be needed. A corporate approach will be necessary. Several goals will have to be met:
• The Intelligence Community itself will have to embrace the idea of change. The severity of the current situation must be realized: the IC must change or be run out of business by the information technology sector of private industry.
• The strategic plan to build an improved IC must be communicated clearly to its members, who must understand why they are being asked to change before they agree to change. A restructured IC would require some employees to change job locations, learn new skills, or undergo some other type of major change, all of which will require "buy-in" from the workforce.
• Leaders must be prepared to deal with morale problems arising from cultural clashes. Decades-old rivalries between CIA and NSA, for instance, have resulted in strong opinions and social class-like structures and attitudes that would come to a head when and if the two workforces were ever combined.
« A public relations campaign will be necessary to gain public acceptance of policy changes and Congressional approval of funding for an IC revitalization.
Of the above goals, the last one probably is the most important. For decades, U.S.
intelligence agents have been portrayed negatively in movies, novels, and in the press. Almost 50 years of steadfast silence on the nature of NSA operations, while necessary during the Cold War, are coming back to haunt NSA in the form of bad press and public suspicion. The CIA constantly makes headlines for perceived failures or abuses. The general public is, more or less, unaware of DIA's existence or its role in the nation's security. Before taxpayers and Congress approve continued funding for the IC, they first must understand why such an institution is necessary.
And an intelligence structure is, indeed, necessary in today's era of transnational threats and uncertain foes. Just how that structure looks and what role it plays are the variables which must now be redefined. In order to fight the Third Wave wars described by the Tofflers in their famous book War and Anti-War, "Either intelligence itself assumes a Third Wave form, meaning it reflects the new role of information, communication, and knowledge in society, or it becomes costly, irrelevant, or dangerously misleading."
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To paraphrase Hayden: by standing still, NSA and the Intelligence Community have fallen dreadfully behind. 22 Catching up is possible, but will require drastic measures aimed at the ultimate objective: maintaining an edge in informational awareness of potential enemies in order to ensure the security of the United States and its citizens.
